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NOTE
POLICING ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE AND INVENTORY
UNDER MODERN FACTOR'S LEGISLATION
ThE FACTORING BusINEss *
The last thirty years \have seen the development of a new source of
credit for small businessmedpi-the assignment of accounts receivable as col-
lateral security for loans kvithonit notice to the account debtor. Several
private finance companies began to operate in this field in the early twenties,'
and since 1933 commercial banks have entered the business in increasing
numbers.2 This financing is commonly called "factoring," and those en-
gaged in it, whether private finance companies or commercial banks, will be
referred to herein as "factors." The modern factor differs from the "straight
line" factor, who simply purchased accounts and notified the account debtor
that payments were to be made to him, retaining no recourse against the
seller of the accounts if account debtors defaulted., For the modem factor,
the assignment, whether drafted as a purchase and sale or as a security
instrument,4 functions as security for the borrower's personal obligation,
and notification to the account debtor that the account is to be paid to the
factor is a last resort, equivalent to foreclosure.l Modern factors may also
lend upon the security of inventory, although accounts are preferred because
the existence of a third-party obligation lessens the lender's risk.6
Accounts receivable financing begins when the borrower presents the
factor with a schedule of accounts payable at specified intervals, usually
thirty, sixty, or ninety days, together with copies of the invoice for each
account. After investigating the borrower, his business and the particular
invoices, the factor will calculate a value, or "aging," for the accounts,
* Observations in this Note as to the practical aspects of the factoring business
are based upon interviews with private factors and commercial bank officials in the
Philadelphia area.
1. SAULINER & JACOBY, AccouNTs RCEIVABLE FINANCING 47 (Nat. Bur. of
Econ. Research 1943).
2. Id. at 53.
3. Id. at 17, 19.
4. The agreement may provide that the accounts are "sold" to the factor, but
with recourse against the borrower if some go bad, or may simply provide that
the accounts are to secure payment of a demand note which the borrower executes.
Private finance companies naturally favor the former instrument, while commercial
banks generally use the latter.
5. Such sudden liquidation of the loan quite often will withdraw so much money
anticipated by the borrower, that he may be forced out of business. This effectis
accentuated by the reaction of general creditors when they see the factor closing in.
6. Inventory loans are not uncommonly made as a prelude to accounts receivable
financing to commence when the inventory is sold, where the borrower is doing a
seasonal business, or as a temporary supplement to accounts receivable financing.
(392)
1952] POLICING ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE AND INVENTORY 393
usually expressed in terms of a percentage of their face value. The loan
will also be a certain percentage of face value, known as the "rate of
advance." 7 As accounts become due, the borrower collects the checks paid
by the account debtors and sends them to the factor at intervals depending
upon the volume of sales. It is not uncommon for the borrower to remit
checks daily. When the factor receives and cashes the checks, he repays
himself for his rate of advance thereon and pays the borrower the excess.
As often as the borrower remits the checks, he assigns new accounts, and
the process begins all over again. Interest, or service charge in the case
of private factors, is not deducted from the borrower's equity in every
account as checks are remitted, but is deducted from the equity in checks
coming in at fixed intervals.8 The terms of this "revolving loan" arrange-
ment are governed by a contract between the borrower and the factor which
extends over a considerable period of time. The contract is usually re-
newed, so that the arrangement may continue for many years. The contract
may provide for the assigning of all accounts, 9 or for such accounts as the
parties shall choose. However, it is always provided that the borrower
will not finance his accounts and inventory with any other concern during
the term of the contract. 10 The factor retains the privilege of refusing to
lend on accounts which are too risky, and of going upon a notification basis
at any time. It is usually agreed that the factor shall have a lien on mer-
chandise returned to or recovered by the borrower from account debtors.
Obviously, the factor's greatest problem in making such financing
profitable is the devising of a policing system to prevent loss due to care-
lessness or fraud on the part of the borrower. A keystone in any policing
system is requiring prompt remittance to the factor of all checks collected
on the accounts." This gives the factor instant warning of any decline in
7. A typical transaction might be the following: The account debtor owes $100,
due in 30 days. Since he runs a very reputable and prompt-paying concern, the
"aging" might be 90% of face value ($90). Commercial banks generally allow
themselves a margin of 10% between aging and rate of advance. Thus the borrower
would get $80 immediately. Private factors, who rely to a lesser extent upon the
general credit of the borrower, allow themselves a 20% margin; $70 would therefore
be advanced.
8. These intervals might be anywhere between one week and one month. During
the intervals, the factor totals up all his advances and figures up his service charges
on the total. This charge is either deducted from the total receipts on the last day
of the period, or else the borrower sends his own check for the amount of the
charges, after he receives the remainder of the money coming to him on the settled
accounts.
9. Since "all accounts" would include some for which payment is made in cash,
the contract will provide that, in such case, the borrower will take all cash proceeds
to a bank, secure a cashier's check for the exact amount of the cash payments, and
immediately send the cashier's check to the factor.
10. Factors justify this provision on the ground that if a borrower finances his
accounts with two or more factors, he is likely to become confused as to which ac-
counts are assigned to each factor, with the result that checks may be remitted to the
wrong factor.
11. There are other aspects of policing, such as regularly auditing the borrower's
books, investigating his invoices, investigating his physical plant and inventory, check-
ing his financial statements, and policing the borrower's disposition of the loan, but
the requirement that checks be promptly remitted remains a central feature.
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the borrower's collections, and a somewhat delayed warning of any decline
in sales. Also, by investigating the checks the factor can discover whether
the borrower has been supplying him with false invoices and hence actually
assigning him nothing, repaying the factor with his own money. In such
a case, the borrower may be "kiting" his assignments, i.e., keeping one step
ahead of the factor by presenting to him the appearance of a growing busi-
ness, making ever-increasing assignments of false accounts and securing
larger and larger loans. For similar reasons, factors make use of the serv-
ices of a field warehousing company when inventory financing is involved in
the transaction, regardless of whether the security device is a field ware-
houseman's receipt or a factor's lien.'
2
In accounts receivable financing, unless the borrower is doing a sea-
sonal business, the separate totals of loans outstanding and accounts
assigned remain fairly constant at all times. For this reason, it may be
suggested that the financing would be simpler if no checks were remitted
and the borrower paid interest in regular installments on a single loan,
secured by a fixed value of accounts to be replenished by new assignments
as old accounts were paid. Factors consider such a method of financing
impractical because of the necessity of requiring regular remittances in
order to police their assignments, and do not feel that checking invoices
would be sufficient in itself. For the same reason, factors are wary of sub-
stituting new accounts for old before the old accounts are paid, although this
procedure may be resorted to occasionally and to a limited extent. 13  Due
to the impracticability of requiring remittances of checks from retailers,
who take such a large proportion of their payments in cash and handle
multitudes of small checks, factors seldom lend to retailers.
BENEDICT V. RATNER 14
In 1925 this decision set forth the rule that, in order to preserve a lien
on accounts receivable, the lender must require the borrower to account for
all the proceeds of assigned accounts, and must forbid the borrower to
divert such proceeds to his own use. The lender's "consent" to such con-
duct on the part of the borrower invalidates the lien, whether the consent
be express Il or implied in fact. 6 Under this rule the lien is destroyed if
the lender consents to the commingling of any of the proceeds with the bor-
rower's own funds.1' If the loan contract provides for a lien upon returned
or recovered goods, as most do, the borrower must not be allowed to credit
12. The Factor's Lien Acts, discussed infra, do not require possession in the
factor, either actual or constructive, as a requisite of a valid lien.
13. Obviously, bookkeeping difficulties also preclude the use of this procedure
on any wide-spread scale.
14. 268 U.S. 353 (1925).
15. Ibid.
16. E.g., Mount v. Norfolk Savings & Loan Corp., 192 F.2d 286 (4th Cir. 1951);
Lee v. State B. & T. Co., 38 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1930).
17. Markovitz v. Taylor, 94 F.2d 782 (3d Cir. 1938), affirming In re Ferguson
Drug Co., 19 F. Supp. 206 (E.D. Pa. 1937).
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the account debtor with the price unless he segregates the goods,18 and
perhaps not even if he segregates the goods; 19 and must not be allowed to
dispose of the goods without remitting the proceeds. Otherwise, the
lender's lien, not only upon the particular account, but on all other accounts
assigned to secure the loan, is invalidated. 20  However, the lien remains
valid when the borrower is permitted to use the proceeds of old accounts
after substituting therefor new accounts of equal value.21  In the field of
inventory financing, where the lien is initially validated by the recording of
a security instrument, the lender must require prompt remittance of the
proceeds of the sale of inventory, or in some states, may substitute new
inventory, in order to maintain the validity of the lien.
22
These rules are said to rest upon the proposition that a reservation
of "dominion" over the security by the borrower is logically inconsistent
with the "effective disposition of title," 23 so that when the rules are not
observed, no security title is created and the arrangement becomes fraud-
ulent as a matter of law. A less conceptual basis for the doctrine of Benedict
v. Ratner may be a desire to prevent frauds upon § 60 of the Bankruptcy
Act,24 which provides for the avoidance of "preferences" by the trustee in
bankruptcy. Under that section, a preference is defined as a transfer by an
insolvent debtor of his property for the benefit of a creditor on account of
an antecedent debt, which results in a depletion of the debtor's estate and
the creditor's obtaining a greater percentage of his debt than some other
creditor of the same class, when the transfer occurs within four months
before the filing of a petition in bankruptcy. 26  Such a transfer may be
avoided by the trustee upon proof that the creditor had reasonable cause
to believe that the debtor was insolvent at the time it was made.2 7 Certain
18. Bloch v. Mill Factors Corp., 119 F.2d 536 (2d Cir. 1941). This case seems
to obligate the factor to take a factor's lien, where available, on returned goods, even
though he does not view the transaction as an inventory loan in the conventional
sense.
19. See Peterson v. Nat. Discount Corp., 179 Wash. 108, 35 P.2d 1097 (1934).
20. See cases cited in Cohen & Gerber, Mortgages of Account Receivable, 29
GEo. L.J. 555, 570 (1941), and in Note, 24 N.Y.U.L.Q. REv. 598, 602 (1949).
21. Second Nat. Bank v. Phillips, 189 F.2d 115 (5th Cir. 1951), reversing In re
American Creameries, 90 F. Supp. 618 (S.D. Texas 1950); In re Pusey, Maynes
Breish Co., 122 F.2d 606 (3d Cir. 1941).
22. See Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 363-364 (1925) ; see cases cited in
Cohen & Gerber, Mortgages of Merchandise, 39 COL. L. REv. 1338, 1345-1347 (1939).
See also, 2 GL.ENN, FRAUDULENT CONVEYANCES AND PREERENCES §§ 582-591 (rev. ed.
1940).
23. Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353, 364 (1925).
24. 30 STAT. 562 (1898), as amended by 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C. § 96
(1946), and 64 STAT. 24, 11 U.S.C. §96(a) (Supp. 1950). See 11 U.S.C.A. §96,
Historical Note.
25. "'Creditors who, in the absence of preferences, are entitled to receive the
same percentage upon their claims out of the estate of the bankrupt, are members
of the same class. Those who are entitled to different percentages are of different
classes."' 3 Comm, BANKRUPTCY 860 (14th ed. 1941).
26. Id. at 753.
27. Ibid.
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preferences are also avoidable under some state statutes. 28 The possibility
of fraudulent evasion of this legislation is that a debtor may, within the
four months period, make such an avoidable transfer of accounts receivable
which arose before the four months period; and, knowing that he or his
creditors will shortly file a petition in bankruptcy, will date the assign-
ment to make it appear that it was executed before the four months period.
Here the only evidence which could prove the correct date of the assign-
ment rests wholly in the hands of the parties.29 Account debtors will not
know when the assignment was made because it is a non-notification ar-
rangement. Had the assignment been policed, however, it could be proved
by the trustee that it was a preference, for the date of indorsement and
cashing of remitted checks will indicate, roughly, at what time the assign-
ment was made. This information can be obtained by consulting the ac-
count debtors or perhaps through their banks. The moving policy behind
the Benedict rule may therefore be that, as a preventive measure, fraud
should be presumed as a matter of law where there has been no policing,
because of the danger that during the time there was no policing there also
was no assignment. It is true that there is no policing when new accounts
are substituted for old, which is permitted under the Benedict rule. How-
ever, the assignment here would involve accounts which did not arise
until after the beginning of the four months period so that if the substitu-
tion gave the assignee accounts of greater value than the old,30 the trustee
would meet no problem of proof. It is noteworthy that in most jurisdictions
there was no legislation providing for the recording of accounts receivable
financing arrangements when Benedict v. Ratner was decided.31
On the other hand, the rule requiring policing of inventory loans
arose while statutes providing for the recordation of chattel mortgages were
in effect . 2 Actually, this rule was deemed a lenient exception to a general
policy invalidating inventory liens, which was based upon the assumption
that the borrower was the "ostensible owner" of his inventory, even if a
chattel mortgage covering the inventory had been recorded.8 8 It was
thought that this ostensible ownership misled general creditors to their
prejudice in estimating their credit risk. Apparently, the courts thought
it unlikely that such creditors would search the records for a chattel mort-
28. E.g., WASH. REv. CODE §§ 23.48.010-.070 (1951). See also 2 GLEHN, op.
cit. s=pra, note 22, §§ 387-393.
29. See Pemberton, Notice Filing for Assignments of Accounts Receivable, 13
LAw & CoNTEmp. PROR. 643, 660 and 653-654, n. 38 (1948).
30. When the transfer within the four month period is made in part for fresh
consideration, it is only avoidable pro tanto. 52 STAT. 869 (1938), 11 U.S.C.
§ 96(b) (1947). See 3 COLLIER, op. cit. sitpra note 25, at 1022.
31. Cohen & Gerber, Mortgages of Accounts Receivable, 29 GEo. L.J. 555, 573-
575 (1941).
32. Cohen & Gerber, Mortgages of Merclndise, 39 Cor. L. Rav. 1338, 1339
(1939).
33. Id. at 1340-1342. The authors note that the exception is based upon the rea-
soning that the borrower who polices does so as the agent of the lender and that this
makes the arrangement not inconsistent with the existence of a security title in the
lender. Id. at 1345-47.
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gage on inventory. The policing exception on inventory loans was a con-
veniently available doctrine extended to accounts receivable to advance a
quite different policy in the Benedict decision.3 4 It should be noted that not
until fairly recently has it become common to lend on inventory, and not
until quite recently has legislation been enacted providing for the separate
recording of factor's liens on inventory.85
Although decided during the era of "federal common law," the Benedict
case purported to announce the common law of New York,3 6 and has been
assumed by the federal courts in bankruptcy cases to be the common law
of many states. 7 Some state courts have expressly followed the case,38
and authorities consider it to be the majority rule.8 9
The application of the doctrine to cases where an assignment of ac-
counts also provides for a lien on returned merchandise causes considerable
inconvenience to factors. In most cases the amount of such merchandise
is comparatively small and no attempt is made to segregate the goods and
have the proceeds from their resale applied to the loan.40 Instead, the bor-
rower's equity in checks remitted from other accounts is debited with the
rate of advance on the price of the returned goods, and the borrower then
adjusts his ledgers to wipe out the account which arose from those goods.
The purpose of the clause providing for a lien on returned goods is to
protect the factor in case the proportion of returned goods becomes too
high. In such a case a system for policing sales of the returned goods and
requiring remittance of the proceeds will be put into effect. The provisions
appearing most often in recent legislation dealing with the Benedict v.
Ratner problem are those aimed at eliminating extreme applications of the
rule in returned goods cases. 41
RECENT LEGISLATION
Since the mid-forties, twenty-eight states have enacted legislation modi-
fying or abolishing, in whole or part, the policing rule of Benedict v. Ratner.
These provisions appear as parts of statutes known as "Accounts Receivable
34. See 2 GLENN, op. cit. mtpra note 22, § 590, to the effect that the inventory
policing rule rests upon the doctrine of ostensible ownership.
35. See the statutes cited under the next sub-heading, notes 44 et seq. infra.
36. 268 U.S. 353, 359, 365 (1925).
37. 4 Coiam, BANxRUPTCy 1389-1390 (14th ed. 1942).
38. Id. at 1390-1391.
39. Id. at 1397, where it also appears that the doctrine has not been abolished
by the UNFoRm FRAUDULENT CONvEYANCE ACr, 9A U.L.A. (1951). As to the effect
of this Act, see also Cohen & Gerber, Mortgages of Accounts Receivable, 29 GEO.
LJ. 555, 571 (1941).
40. Where the amount of returned goods and price allowances to account debtors
is quite small, the courts will not find that the lender consented to an exercise of
"dominion" by the borrower so as to invalidate the lien. Bloch v. Mill Factors
Corp., 134 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1943) ; In re Gandolfi & Co., 113 F.2d 300 (2d Cir.
1940). However, the difficulty is that the factor must guess what amount of re-
turned goods and price allowances the courts will find to be so small as to be in-
significant. Cf. Zydney v. N. Y. Credit Men's Ass'n. 113 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1940).
41. E.g., Lee v. State B. & T. Co, 38 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1930), and see note 40,
siPra.
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Acts" 42 and "Factor's Lien Acts." There is some degree of overlapping
between the two types of statutes so that, where both are in effect, the
factor may find it necessary to comply with both in order to obtain maxi-
mum protection against the Benedict v. Ratner rule. Of course, the factor
may use other devices for inventory financing, but will usually be required
to police.4 Eight of the ten Factor's Lien Acts dealing with the problem
permit not only liens on inventory, but may be availed of to secure a lien
on the accounts to arise from the sale of liened merchandise." Only the
New Hampshire Factor's Lien Act provides for taking a lien upon ac-
counts not arising from the sale of liened merchandise; 45 in other states,
as to such accounts, the Accounts Receivable Acts must be complied with.
In financing accounts receivable some states require the filing of a notice of
intention to assign accounts under an Accounts Receivable Act in order
to acquire any lien; 46 in other states this is required only when the financing
is on a non-notification basis.47
42. The provisions of these acts dealing with the Benedict problem were a side-
light to the principal aim of these statutes, which was to abolish the "English"
rule that a subsequent bona fide assignee for value, who notifies the account debtor
of the assignment, prevails over a prior assignee who has not notified. 2 GIENN,
op. cit. supra note 22, § 527. Such a change became necessary in jurisdictions ad-
hering to this rule because of the Supreme Court's decision in Corn Exchange Nat.
B. & T. Co. v. Klauder, 318 U.S. 434 (1943), that the trustee in bankruptcy was
possessed of the rights of a hypothetical subsequent assignee for value and could
hence prevail over the lien of a non-notifying assignee. See Koessler, New Legisla-
tion Affecting Non-Notification Financing of Accounts Receivable, 44 Micn. L.
REv. 563, 575, 584-604 (1946). The Klawder case has since been nullified by amend-
ing § 60(a) of the Bankruptcy Act. 64 STAT. 24, 11 U.S.C. § 96(a) (Supp. 1950) ;
See Countryman, The Secured Transactions Article of the Commercial Code and
Section 60 of the Bankruptcy Act, 16 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 76, 87-89 (1951).
43. As to chattel mortgages, policing is required. See Cohen & Gerber, Mort-
gages of Merchandise, 39 CoL. L. Ray. 1338, 1345-1347 (1939). As to trust receipts,
the situation is ambiguous. The U nioIp TRUST Racanrs Acr § 10(b), (c) 9A
U.L.A. (1951) imposes the Benedict rule as to proceeds of inventory, but is silent
as to inventory itself. The Commissioners' Prefatory Note, 9A U.L.A. 274-283
(1951), however, discloses no intention to make any changes in the Benedict rule.
See also § 17 of the Act.
As to conditional sales, there is a divergence of opinion among the courts, many
holding that the Benedict rule does not apply. See 4 ColuIEn, op. cit. supra note 37,
at 1384-1385. Actually, a Benedict situation is unlikely to arise in trust receipt *or
conditional sale financing of inventory, since such lending is customarily done on a
self-liquidating rather than a revolving long-term loan basis. As long as the lender
has only the goods enumerated in the particular trust receipt or conditional sale docu-
ment to rely upon, it is quite unlikely that he will be tempted to deviate from strict
policing as to these goods.
44. ALA. CoDE ANN. tit. 47, §§ 132(1)-132(8) (Michie Supp. 1949); Maine
Pub. Laws 1945 c. 79; MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 514.80-514.91 (1949) ; N.J. STAT. ANN.
§§ 2:60-252 to 2:60-260 (Supp. 1951) ; N.Y. PERs. PROP. LAW § 45; VT. REv. STAT.
§§2738-2751 (1947); W. VA. CODE ANN. §§3946(17)-3946(24) (Michie Supp.
1949) ; Wis. Laws 1951, c. 486. The only Factor's Lien Act containing a provision
dealing with the effect of Benedict v. Ratner on accounts which does not provide for
a lien upon any accounts is TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 5506c (Vernon Supp.
1952). The Rhode Island statute (R.I. GENr. LAws ANY. art. 447 (1938)) provides
for a lien on accounts arising from liened merchandise, but does not deal with the
Benedict problem.
45. N.H. Laws 1951, c. 218, § 4, amending N.H. Laws 1949, c. 156 and N.H.
Laws 1943, c. 161.
46. See, e.g., CAL. Civ. CODE tit. 14, § 3018 (Deering Supp. 1951); OHIo GEN.
CoDE ANN. §§8509-6(1) and 8509-5(1) (Page Supp. 1951).
47. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §44-80 (1950).
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Most of these recent statutes are aimed at preventing extreme applica-
tions of the Benedict v. Ratner rule in cases where goods are returned to
or recovered by the borrower.48  These follow the lead of the New York
Factor's Lien Act 49 in providing that if the borrower deals with returned
or recovered goods as his own property or makes a price adjustment in
favor of an account debtor, the lien of the lender upon any balance still
owing on the particular account or on any other account shall not be in-
validated merely because the lender consented to such conduct. The New
York Act and Factor's Lien Acts in five other states 8 0 afford this protec-
tion to assignments of accounts when a factor's lien has been filed, whether
or not the accounts arise from goods subject to the factor's lien. The
Vermont statute extends this protection only to assignments of accounts
arising from liened goods.51 Accounts Receivable Acts in fourteen states
afford this protection to all accounts receivable.
52
Six states have adopted Accounts Receivable Acts which abolish the
Benedict doctrine as to all assignments of accounts when the parties comply
with filing provisions. 8  Factor's Lien Acts in two states abolish the doc-
trine both as to inventory and as to accounts arising from liened inventory
when filing requirements have been satisfied.54 Although there is an
Accounts Receivable Act in New Hampshire,55 the Factor's Lien Act in
that state has recently been amended to permit the filing of liens not only
upon merchandise but also upon accounts, whether or not the merchandise
from which the accounts arise is also subject to the lien.58 The amendment
abolishes the policing rule as to all accounts receivable, provided that filing
requirements have been met. 57 This was generated by a federal decision
that the Benedict rule applied to accounts receivable under the New Hamp-
shire Accounts Receivable Act.58 On the other hand, there is not now and
never has been any express provision in the Factor's Lien Act either
48. See note 40 sipra and accompanying text.
49. N.Y. Pms. PROP. LAW § 45.
50. The Alabama, Maine, New Jersey, Texas and West Virginia statutes cited
supra, note 44. The Texas statute provides only for the case of price adjustments
by the borrower, and not for the case of the borrower who uses the proceeds of re-
turned goods. Tax. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 5506c, § 6 (Vernon Supp. 1952). The
Texas Act does not apply to any stock of goods exposed daily for retail sale in parcels.
Id. § 10.
51. VT. Rrv. STAT. § 2748 (1947).
52. AI.A. CODE ANN. tit. 39, § 212 (Michie Supp. 1949) ; CAI, Civ. CODE tit. 14,
§ 3025 (Deering 1949) ; CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 12(A), § 5 (Michie Supp. 1951) ; CONN.
Rav. GEN. STAT. § 6722 (1949); F. STAT. § 524.05 (1949); IDAHO CODE ANN.
§ 64-905 (1948); KAN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 58-805 (1949); Maine Pub. Laws 1945,
c. 100, § 170-B; MAss. ANN. LAWS c. 107A, § 5 (1946) ; MiNr. STAT. § 521.05 (1949) ;
Mo. REV. STAT. § 410.050 (1949) ; NEB. REv. STAT. § 69-616 (1950); TEx. REv. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 260-1 (Vernon 1947) ; 5 UTAH CODE ANN. § 81B-05 (Supp. 1951).
53. Ga. Laws 1952, No. 811, § 8; MicH. STAT. ANN. tit. 14, § 19.846 (Rice
Supp. 1951); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 44-83 (1950); OHio GEN. CoDa ANN. § 8509-6b
(Page Supp. 1951); S.C. Laws 1946, No. 433, p. 1324, §1(7); 5 WASH. Ray.
CODa § 63.16.030 (1951).
54. MixN. STAT. §514.89 (1949); Wis. Laws 1951, c. 486, §241.145(10).
55. N.H. Laws 1945, c. 19.
56. N.H. Laws 1951, c. 218, § 1, amending N.H. Laws 1943, c. 161 and N.H.
Laws 1949, c. 156.
57. N.H. Laws 1951, c. 218, § 4.
58. Manchester Nat. Bank v. Roche, 186 F.2d 827 (1st Cir. 1951).
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modifying or abolishing the policing rule as to inventory. In the face of
this lack of statutory direction, the state supreme court held that the
Benedict rule, which had been the common law of the state,59 was abolished
as to inventory, since the Act contained no provision requiring policing.60
This is highly significant in that twelve states have enacted Factor's Lien
Acts requiring filing, but containing no provision expressly approving or
rejecting the Benedict doctrine.0 1 Since the New Hampshire case is the
only one construing this type of statute, it will undoubtedly be urged as
precedent for the abolition of the doctrine as to inventory.
Some states have enacted Accounts Receivable Acts which do not
require filing, but are merely aimed at changing the "English" rule requir-
ing notice to the account debtor to protect an assignment of an account
against a subsequent assignee.62  A federal court has held that such a
"validation" statute does not alter the rule of Benedict v. Ratner.63 The
same result would probably be reached under statutes requiring the nota-
tion of an assignment in the assignor's books to validate it against sub-
sequent assignees.0 4 It appears obvious that the statutes dealing only with
the returned goods problem are intended to do away only with that extreme
application of the Benedict v. Ratner rule.6
It is interesting to note that the Factor's Lien Acts and Accounts
Receivable Acts generally follow the example of the Uniform Trust Receipts
Act 66 in requiring only the filing of a general notice of the financing ar-
rangement, without the necessity of filing amended notices specifically
covering property acquired thereafter.
67
CONCLUSION
It has been seen that factors consider that requiring prompt remittance
of the proceeds of assigned accounts is necessary for their protection against
59. In re Freaman, 84 F. Supp. 441 (D.N.H. 1949) (recorded chattel mortgage);
Putnam v. Osgood, 52 N.H. 148 (1872) (unrecorded chattel mortgage).
60. Colbath v. Mechanick's Nat. Bank, 96 N.H. 110, 70 A.2d 608 (1950).
61. CONN. Rv. GEN. STAT. §§7255-7264 (1949); Del. Laws 1947, c. 163; MD.
ANN. CoDn art. 2, §§ 21-28 (Flack 1951); MAss. ANN. LAws c. 255, §§40-47 (Supp.
1951); MIcH. STAT. ANN. §§26.415(1)-26.415(12) (Rice Supp. 1951); Mo. REv.
STAT. §§430.260-430.320 (1949); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 44-70 to 44-76 (1950); OHIO
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borrowers. Thus it may be seriously questioned whether abolishing the
Benedict v. Ratner policing requirement would have any business effect.
On the other hand, it is not the function of the law to punish lenders be-
cause they have been careless with their security, nor to stand in their
way should they desire to find some better and cheaper method of policing,
if such exists. It may well be that lenders, and especially banks, may be
willing to make loans on inventory and accounts without the strict policing
which the rule requires where the borrower's financial status is nearly
sufficient to justify an open line of credit. When a statute permitting public
recordation of accounts receivable financing arrangements exists and has
been complied with,68 the apparent justification for the rule-the danger
of fraudulent evasion of statutes forbidding preferences-ceases; for then
there can be no contest as to when the financing arrangement was made, and
information as to the date when any particular account arose is not confined
to the lender and the borrower. Should the financing arrangement on
record provide for the assigning of only part of the borrower's accounts
the danger that the borrower may preferentially assign additional accounts
to secure the loan, hiding the fact of the preference, seems too small to
justify retaining the rule. The fact that accounts receivable financing is
done only on an exclusive basis, which assures the factor of the better ac-
counts, coupled with the factor's customary reservations of safety margins
between agings and rate of advance, reduces the probability that he would
find himself in need of such a preference.69
So far as policing rules as to inventory rest upon the doctrine of
ostensible ownership rather than upon the policy which entered the law
with the Benedict v. Ratner decision, the rules would seem to be out-of-date.
Inventory loans have now become sufficiently common that it does not
appear that general creditors or the credit agencies from which they obtain
their information may reasonably assume that inventory is a lien-free asset,
especially when resort to the public records is facilitated by the separate
filing of inventory liens. The Uniform Commercial Code, which contains
broad filing requirements,7" accepts this theory and expressly abolishes the
Benedict v. Ratner doctrine as to both accounts receivable and inventory.71
68. Some borrowers object to the publicity of having their assignments recorded,
on the ground that it makes them look like a poor risk to their general creditors.
Perhaps some creditors do attach a stigma to debtors borrowing on their accounts,
although this attitude dates from an era in which such financing was not common
and only resorted to as a desperation measure. At the present time, the purpose
of most accounts receivable financing is to provide funds for business expansion.
69. The probable result of retaining the Benedict rule in cases where some but
not all the borrower's accounts are to be assigned under the arrangement on record
would be that, in the future, recorded financing arrangements would provide that
all accounts are subject to the lien. This follows from the fact that, in practice, the
borrower is obligated by his agreement with the factor not to assign accounts to
anyone else, and hence is indifferent as to whether some or all of his accounts are
security for the loan.
70. § 9-302 (Official Draft 1952).
71. § 9-205 and comment (Official Draft 1952).
